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DDI #4178-82

18 May 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.  
Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT : Decision on Warning Working Group Report


1. On 13 May I sent to you a recommendation on the report and a memorandum for you to send to the NFIB. It was sent through the DDI, Executive Director, and the DDCI. That memorandum and comments are attached as a reference.

2. You and I discussed the memorandum on 17 May and you asked me to revise the memorandum with the following points in mind:

- you noted that warning was proposed as a part-time responsibility for the DDCI, C/NIC, and perhaps the NIO/W;
- you wanted warning to be a full-time responsibility for at least one person;
- the 13 May papers were too cryptic;
- the decision memorandum to the NFIB should be more specific.

3. A decision memorandum to the NFIB is attached for your approval and signature.

- it designates the NIO/W as a full-time position;
- it includes advice to the Watch Committee as one responsibility of the NIO/W;
- it abolishes the Strategic Warning Staff;
- it establishes a small National Warning Staff.



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4. In response to concerns expressed by Bob Gates and John McMahon about personnel, I propose that we enter into Warning Working Group discussion with a tentative T/O as follows:

NIO/W  
A/NIO/W  
Special Ass't Warning

NIC billet  
NIC billet  
NIC contract

To be selected

Harry Cochran

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Staff  
Staff

Rotate among  
DIA, NSA, CIA,  
INR

DIA Incumbent  
To be selected

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*H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.*  
H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.

APPROVED:

*William J. Casey*  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

27 MAY 1982

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

DISAPPROVED:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: The National Foreign Intelligence Board

FROM : Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Decision on Warning Working Group Report

1. My discussion and consideration of the warning issues has continued in a variety of forums since we reviewed the Working Group Report at the 19 January NFIB. Drawing upon the report for a frame of reference, I have made the following decisions:

- a. We should consider the National Intelligence Warning System as defined in the current DCID to be composed of the separate warning activities in the Intelligence Community components plus the NIO for Warning.
- b. The mission of the system is to advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to warning intelligence and to coordinate the warning activities of the Intelligence Community.
- c. The basic warning mission will be as defined in DCID 1/5: "to avoid surprise to the President, the NSC, and the Armed Forces of the United States by foreign events of major importance..." That mission and definition will be expanded as appropriate to ensure attention to more slowly developing, longer-term intelligence problems relating to the security of the United States. The warning mission will give highest priority to warning of an attack on the US or its allies.
- d. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence will oversee the National Intelligence Warning System with the advice of the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
- e. The position of National Intelligence Officer for Warning will be a full-time position. His mission is to advise and assist the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on all matters relating to warning, to coordinate national intelligence warning activities, and to serve as a focal point for warning in the Community. He will to the maximum extent rely on existing organizations in carrying out his duties. His responsibilities are:

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- (1) To oversee analysis of intelligence from all sources which might provide warning. In particular, he should be alert to alternate interpretations within the Community and assess these with a view to the need for issuance of warning. He should encourage consultation and substantive discussion at all levels in the Community.
- (2) To recommend to the Director or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence the issuance of warning to the President and National Security Council, and to ensure the dissemination of such warning within and by the organizations of the Intelligence Community. When time is of the essence, the National Intelligence Officer may issue such warning directly to the President and the National Security Council, with concurrent dissemination to the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and senior officers of the Intelligence Community.
- (3) To advise the Chairman, National Intelligence Council and the DCI Watch Committee on appropriate Community response to developing warning situations.
- (4) To support the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the National Foreign Intelligence Board on warning matters.
- (5) To chair the Warning Working Group.
- (6) To oversee the warning activities of the National Intelligence Officers.
- (7) To supervise the National Warning Staff.
- (8) To arrange for intelligence research and production with respect to strategic warning.
- (9) To develop a warning consciousness and discipline throughout the Community.
- (10) To seek improvements in methodologies and procedures for warning, including communications and dissemination of information.
- (11) To arrange with appropriate organizations of the government for provision to the National Intelligence Officer for Warning and the Warning Staff of the information they need to carry out their mission.

- (12) To promote improved analyst training in indications and warning techniques and in other analytic techniques that might contribute to improved warning.
  - (13) To advise the Director, Intelligence Community Staff and the chairmen of the collection requirements committees, as appropriate, on warning activities that relate to their responsibilities.
  - f. The Warning Working Group, chaired by the National Intelligence Officer for Warning, will assist him in carrying out his responsibilities and in coordinating Community warning activities. Its Members shall be senior officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; Central Intelligence Agency; Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; Office of the Secretary of Defense; and the Intelligence Community Staff. The Chairman shall invite representatives of other departments and agencies to attend when matters of concern to them are discussed.
  - g. The National Intelligence Officers continue to be charged with substantive responsibility for warning in their respective fields. They will conduct Community-wide reviews at least monthly of situations potentially requiring the issuance of warning, and will keep the Director of Central Intelligence advised of the results, in consultation with the National Intelligence Officer for Warning. They will be continually alert to the need for immediate issuance of warning.
  - h. The Strategic Warning Staff is disestablished.
  - i. A National Warning Staff is established to support the National Intelligence Officer for Warning. This will be a small staff with appropriate representation from the Intelligence Community.
  - j. DCID 1/5 will be revised and reissued to bring it into accord with the decisions described above and with the current structure of the Intelligence Community.
2. The Chairman, National Intelligence Council and the National Intelligence Officer for Warning will work with you to implement these decisions.

15/  
William J. Casey

DCI TALKING POINTS  
ON WARNING

NFIB 8 June 1982

- I. Decision Memo on warning completes a series of efforts to improve our ability to produce warning intelligence.
  - A. New initiatives in research support production of warning.
    1. Center for Terrorism Instability and Insurgency will identify causes and indicators of change.
    2. Intelligence Producers Council will coordinate Community research efforts on Third World and Soviet Bloc developments having warning implications.
  - B. NIO's will identify mid- to long-term warning situations through their estimates and monthly warning meetings.
  - C. Watch Committee will highlight short-term warning developments.
  - D. Alerting of fast breaking events will continue to be the function of our Ops Centers through the use of procedures such as CRITICS and NIOWONS.
- II. NIO for Warning and National Warning Staff will oversee and advise all the above. (Harry Cochran fits in here as Special Assistant for Warning)
  - A. Identify events and alternative outcomes not given adequate hearing in standard products.
  - B. Participate in and contribute to the production of estimates and Watch Committee reports.

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- C. Nominate, contribute, participate, conduct or coordinate specific research projects on warning matters.
  - D. Draw upon the results and products of individual agency and departmental warning activities, but not rely exclusively on their efforts. The whole should be greater than the sum of the parts.
- III. The Warning Working Group will be retained to assist the NIO/W. I look to them to carry out the implementation of this decision.
- IV. Warning function and Warning Staff will continue to be a Community effort.
- A. Warning function will be lodged in the National Intelligence Council.
  - B. NIO/W will be a full time position.
  - C. Composition, size and location of the staff will be worked out by Warning Working Group.
- V. The Warning mission will continue to be to insure "no surprise" to the President, NSC and Armed Forces. Obviously warning of an attack on the US or its allies is first priority; however, we must also address slowly-developing, longer-term threats to US security--within the warning context.
- VI. The Alert Memorandum will be retained as a warning medium, but it is not the exclusive one since both estimates and the Watch Committee reports will have warning content. Other means of conveying the warning message will be employed when needed. Content, not form, is what is important.

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